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“廿五经研”建院25周年25场学术系列报告之三暨山大行为实验经济学公开分享荟第2021年第2期预告

发布日期:2021-04-07   作者:    浏览次数:
时间 2021年4月8日15:30 地点 腾讯会议 房间号:962808052

时间:2021年4月8日15:30

地点:腾讯会议 房间号:962808052

题目:Stuck in the Wisdom of Crowds: Knowledge, Information and Heuristics

主讲人简介:郑捷,清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授,博士生导师,经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任,Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization和Research in Economics杂志副编。研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和参照依赖、自我控制、互惠利他等行为问题,通过运用理论和实验相结合的分析手段研究不完全信息环境下的个体行为、多方互动、市场均衡。成果发表于American Economic Review (P&P)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等知名期刊。曾获"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖",2016-2018连续三年获"中国信息经济学青年创新奖"。

内容摘要:It is well-acknowledged that collective knowledge can be significantly affected by social influences. However, the understanding of when and how the “wisdom of crowds” helps or harms knowledge at an individual level remains incomplete. We provide subjects with the task of answering 50 factual and uncontroversial true or false trivia questions, with the potential opportunity to revise their answers after having received varying levels of information about other subjects’ answers and self-assessed confidence levels from an independent session. The results show that information about other subjects’ answers improves performance on easy questions, but often negatively affects performance on difficult questions. Observing the answers of other subjects generally improves performance for those with lower knowledge levels originally. Subjects in the moderate information condition outperform those in either the low or high information conditions, implying an optimal level of social information provision, in which the majority rule and maximum confidence rule complement one another. The results enhance our understanding of the effects of information provision under different social conditions, and also confirm the frequent use of majority rule as a heuristic.