题目： Effort as Attention: Persuading an Information-Averse Agent to Work
摘要：Workers with information aversion are particularly inclined to shirk due to the fear of the real-time feedback generated by the job tasks. This paper provides a principal-agent model to characterize the “effort-as-attention” effect, and studies how a principal can motivate an information-averse worker to exert effort through dynamic Bayesian persuasion. In a two-period effort provision problem, whether the agent can complete her task is related to her two choices about whether to exert effort, her own ability and the difficulty of the task. The agent knows neither her ability nor the difficulty of the task, with the former only observable by her choice to work, and the latter only knowable by the communication from the principal. I fully characterize the optimal dynamic information disclosure policy. This policy has three features in contrast to the “information as carrot” policy identified by Ely and Szydlowski (2020). First, because the agent dislikes information, the principal uses information as a stick to punish the shirking in the first period. Second, in contrast, if the agent works in the first period, the principal hides some information to enhance the utility of the information-averse agent, thereby incentivizing the agent to exert effort in the first period. Third, prior to the two-period effort choice, the principal can dispel procrastination-inducing beliefs by information disclosure. Some further extensions are also investigated.