题目: Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring
We study a principal's joint design of optimal monitoring and compensation schemes to incentivize an agent by incorporating information design into a dynamic contracting framework. The principal can flexibly allocate her limited monitoring capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or contradicts the agent's effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. When the agent's continuation value is low, the principal seeks only confirmatory evidence. When it exceeds a threshold, the principal seeks mainly contradictory evidence. Importantly, the agent's effort is perpetuated if and only if he is sufficiently productive.
戴亮，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授，于2015年获得美国普林斯顿大学经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为博弈论和信息经济学，研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory等经济学顶级期刊。