题目：Team Race Against Time: Theory and Experiment
摘要：This paper theoretically and experimentally studies when teams compete against time. Players exert effort at a steady rate in continuous time. The first team whose accumulated effort hits a threshold wins a prize. We examine the effect of the prize value and prize allocation mechanism on this time-based competition. The prize value divided by the number of competing teams can be higher or lower than the threshold. In the winning team, the prize can be allocated equally among its members, in proportion to members’ efforts, or through an endogenous voting system. Both the theoretical model and the experimental results show that the fierceness of the competition is primarily determined by the prize value. Although the contributed efforts are similar under the three allocation mechanisms, it is not because players do not try to free-ride on others when the prized is shared equally or endogenously. A team whose members pause their contribution can be surpassed by its competitors. Also, players have used strategies such as tit-for-tat, conditional cooperation, reward, and punishment that lead to high cooperation levels. We show that unlike in other forms of competition, the allocation mechanism has little effect on the contribution level when teams compete against time.
专家介绍：冷艾琳，任职于南京审计大学，她的研究方向为行为经济学和实验经济学，具体为连续时间的经济实验和检验合作博弈理论的经济实验，她的研究成果发表于Games and Economic Behavior（独立作者）和Experimental Economics。